INTRODUCTION
In response to the global financial crisis central authorities around the world adopted, in the first phase, a series of traditional rescue measures directed at individual institutions. These measures consisted of liquidity support to failing institutions, that, subsequently, were sold or merged with stronger parteners 1 . The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the government and the collapse of Lehman Brothers worsen the financial conditions and send a sentiment of uncertaintly among participants, that led to a drying up of funding markets (Stolz & Wedow, 2010) . The shock generated by the Lehman Brothers' collapse and the liquidity pressures were felt rapidly by the European banking systems. In this situation, the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank were forced to adopt non-standard measures designed to ease credit and liquidity constraints in order to restore financial stability and to maintain the lending to real economy (Carpeter, Demiralp, & Eisenschmidt, 2014) . The measures implemented refer to expansion of the volume of lending facilities, longer-term financing, more frecvent auctions or even changes in the auctining process, a wide range of accepted collateral, direct asset purchases and liquidity facilities for intermediaries other than banks (Stolz & Wedow, 2010) .
In general, the measures implemented in EU have been broadly similar to those adopted in the US. In both cases, the authorities have employed broadly the same tools (e.g. government guarantees, capital and liquidity injections, and asset protection) and have relied on a mix of ad hoc measures for individual institutions and schemes addressing the wider needs of the financial system. But, there are also some differences between the policies adopted in the US and the EU. The measures adopted by Federal Reserve System have been more expansive and have targeted also individual financial intermediaries, while the European Central Bank actions have been limited to liquidity extension. Another difference between the policies adopted in these two economies refer to the fact that capital injections were a requirement in the US, while in Europe capital support has typically been voluntary (Stolz & Wedow, 2010) .
In this paper, we review the unconventional measures adopted by Federal Reserve System and European Central Bank and assess their effects. It is important for policy makers to establish which measures were effective in limiting the financial system distress in order to adopt the appropiate measure during future crisis. For US, TARP was the most important measure for banking system, US Treasury investing $245 billion in financial institutions. TARP was effective in reducing banks' contribution to systemic risk, in reducing banks' default probabilities, but conducted to a reduction in loans growth and higher risk-taking. The unconventional monetary policies measures adopted by ECB during the period 2008-2016 achieved their objectives: to support banks' funding and to increase lending to real economy (LTROs), to calm tensions from bond markets (CBPP, SMP, OMT), to support economic activity and to stabilize inflation rate (SMP, OMT, LTROs, APP).
US RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL CRISIS

Policy interventions during financial crisis
The US central authorities implemented during financial crisis a range of programs to sustain the affected sectors: small business, auto industry, financial markets, final consumers, pension funds and housing market. In this section we focus on the financial markets' measures, but mainly on bank based measures adopted by the American authorities. The authorities that have the power to intervine into American economy are Feb, FDIC and the Government.
Measures directed to financial markets
The measures adopted by the Fed had a direct or indirect impact on financial institutions or financial sectors. For exemple, the Recovery Act through the tax relief applied to the American taxpayers improved the financial conditions of banking clients. The supplementary amount could be used to obtain a larger amount of loans or to deposit it. 
Measures directed to banking system
The main bank based measure adopted by Fed was Term Auction Facility. The objective of this facility was to provide liquidity to financial institutions in the early stages of the crisis when the bank funding markets confronted with severe pressure. 
The effectiveness of policy interventions in US
Discount window and TAF program were the first programs aimed to sustain the US financial system. Berger, Black, Bouwman, & Dlugosz (2017) studied the efects of these facilities on bank lending, concluding that the received funds were used to increase lending by both small and large banks. The positive effects of TAF program were confirmed by Frank & Hesse (2009) Current research sustain the fact that banks shifted their portofolios toward riskier borrowers and the manifestation of moral hazard (Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014) . Black & Hazelwood (2013) concluded that, compared with non-TARP banks, large banks that received TARP capital increased the risk of the new granted loans, while small banks decreased it. The increased level of banks' risk-taking in the absence of increased lending may be the result of moral hazard, the offered bailout creating the perception for 'Too-big-to-fail' banks of implicit government support going forward. This result is confirmed by Duchin and Sosyura (2014) who found that an increase in banks' capital did not conducted to a credit expansion, but instead lead to riskier lending and investments, TARP banks offering favorable loan contract terms especially to high-risk borrowers (Berger, Makaew, & Roman, 2016) . Wilson & Wu (2010) provide evidence regarding the fact that banks that face insolvency and participate in a preferred stock recapitalization are tempted to reject good loans and accept the bad ones in order to shift risk to their creditors. This suggest that the size of the capital injection and the lack of any leverage-increasing limit may have lead to inefficiency in the TARP program.
Farruggio, Michalak & Uhde (2013) revealed a light and a dark side of TARP program. They studied the impact of both announcements of TARP program (initial and revised), of capital injections and capital repayments on changes in bank shareholder value and risk exposure of 125 recipient banks. In their study, the dark side of this program refers to the fact that the announcements of TARP program as well as capital injections increased systemic risk. Capital injections are perceived by investors as a signal of higher expected default risk of supported banks. On the other hand, the announcements of TARP and capital repayments increased bank shareholder value. These results are confirmed by Ncube (2016) who concluded that the announcement of TARP program increased investors' confidence, but the receipt of TARP funds determined a negative market reaction with important stock price declines. Another negative effect of TARP capital injections was the reduction in operational efficiency for TARP recipients banks. Harris, Huerta, & Ngo (2013) argue this result through the moral hazard generated by bailouts, the political pressure to increase lending that reduced loans quality, the requirements imposed by TARP program and the government involvement in bank management decisions.
In contrast with the previous work, there are studies that prove the positive effects of TARP program on US banks (Berger, Another positive effect of TARP program, highlighted by Liu, Kolari, Tippens, & Fraser, (2013) was the CPP banks' stock prices recovery and, furthermore, large and significant gains after the repayments of CPP funds.
To conclude, the literature does not offer a general accepted opinion regarding the overall effect of TARP program on US banking system. This effect is depending on the analyzed time-horizon (short vs. long term), the different stages of TARP program (announcements, capital injections or repayments), the computation of dependent variables (e.g. systemic risk vs. lending growth) and the independent financial variables used. 
EU RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL CRISIS
Traditionally, the ECB provides to central banks two standing facilities that can be used on their own initiative whenever they need liquidity or to deposit liquidity. These facilities refer to Marginal lending facility and Deposit facility but normally banks use them in the absence of other alternatives, as the interest rates are higher, respectively lower than money market rates.
Policy interventions during financial crisis
To manage the liquidity in the money market, ECB uses, through National Central Banks, open market operations. The most important operations are Main refinancing operations (MROs) and Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Another instrument used by ECB to manage liquidity is the Minimum reserve requirements, banks being bound to hold a specific value of their liabilities as deposits to central banks. The reserve ratio was reduced in December 2011 to 1% from 2% as a measure to improve banks liquidity conditions (ECB, 2016). During the financial crisis, ECB reacted by several interest rates rises and cuts both for refinancing operations and standing facilities. ECB had recourse to unconventional monetary policy as the conventional ones proved ineffective. The ECB's Governing Council decides the measures, but the Eurosystem as a whole implements them.
The European banking system faced significant losses since the fallout of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. Consequently, banks started to have doubts about the solvency of their counterparties from the interbank market, which conducted to important shortage of liquidity and the collapse of activity in many financial market segments (Boeckx, Dossche, & Peersman, 2017) . To respond to the increased and unpredictable demand of liquidity, ECB started with several Liquidity-providing operations in July 2007. These operations continued until the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008. Starting from that point, ECB implemented several monetary policies that were "unprecedented in nature, scope and magnitude". The aim of these policies was to achieve the primary objective of price stability (HICP inflation rates below, but close to 2%) and to ensure an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism to real economy. The adopted measures during the period 2007 -2016 can be analyzed in Table 2 .1.
On 15 October 2008, Governing Council decided that all ECB's operations to be carried out through fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment. This means that all refinancing operations in euro and US dollars to be conducted through tender procedures with fixed rate (equal to the ECB's policy rate in the case of operations denominated in euro) and full allotment (all bids were satisfied). On the same day, Governing Council announced the extension of the collateral list and the foreign exchange swaps. Traditionally, collateral refers to marketable financial securities, such as bonds 7 and other types of assets, such as fixed term and cash deposits and credit claims. In addition, ECB offered liquidities in US dollars and Swiss francs through foreign exchange swaps. The objective of these interventions was to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
September 2012
The differences between the two programs refer to:  OMTs are attached to a European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism programme, ensuring that the Member States remain under considerable pressure to implement reforms and maintain fiscal discipline;  the maturity of OMT programme is between one and three years;  publication of relevant information on OMT interventions;  the size of the programme is unlimited;  Possibility to sell the bought government bonds under OMT with their valuation based on market prices rather than on final maturity. During this year, Governing Council also announced the Covered Bond Purchase Program, through which ECB will purchase euro-denominated covered bond issued in the euro area. The objectives of this program were to reduce money market term rates, to ease funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises, to encourage credit institutions to maintain or to expand their lending to households and enterprises and to improve market liquidity in important segments of private debt securities markets (Gonzales-Paramo, 2011). This program ended in June 2010, when the announced nominal amount of 60 billion EUR was reached. Eurosystem purchased 422 different bonds, from the primary market (27%) and secondary market (73%) (ECB, 2010) .
In order to reduce the severe tensions from securities markets in the first phase of sovereign debt crisis, Governing Council launched in May 2010 Securities Market Programme. Through this program, central authorities conducted interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets to ensure liquidity to dysfunctional market segments. The objective of the decision to purchase distressed European government bonds was to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism (ECB, May 2010). The injected liquidity under this program will be reabsorbed through specific operations. In 2012, the outstanding amount reached a nominal value of 218 billion EUR, Italy having a debt of 102.8 billion, followed by Spain (44.3 billion), Greece (33.9 billion), Portugal (22.8 billion) and Ireland (14.2 billion) (ECB, 2013). In 2016, the outstanding amount accounted for 105 billion EUR, of which Italy has 54.9 billion, Spain 20.1 billion, Greece 13.2 billion, Portugal 9.5 billion and Ireland 7.3 billion.
In 2011, given the renewed tensions in the financial markets related to the sustainability of public finances in both the US and the euro area and to the increased concerns regarding the global economic outlook, Governing Council The increased fears among investors regarding the reversibility of the euro conducted to severe cases of malfunctioning in the price formation process in the government bond markets -the largest capital market in the euro area. In an economic environment characterized by high spreads between the yields on the government bonds of euro area countries, ECB introduced in September 2012 Outright Monetary Transactions. OMT programme was designed starting from SMP but made it more targeted. Under the OMT, ECB makes purchases of bonds from Eurozone countries in the secondary market to calm the market interest rates in countries subject to speculation.
Expanded Asset Purchase Program, implemented in January 2015, includes all purchase programmes under which private and public sector securities are purchased to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation. Under this program, ECB creates new money to purchase euro-denominated, investmentgrade securities issued by euro area governments and European institutions (quantitative easing). At the end of April 2017, Eurosystem holdings under this program amounted 1,834 billion EUR of which PSPP covers 1,511 billion.
The measures previously described are part of a package of measures that also includes targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). Under the first series of TLTROs, Eurosystem provided financing to credit institutions for periods of up to four years, based on the amount of their loans to non-financial corporation and households (targeted operations). The second TLTRO provided even more attractive interest rates based on the loans issued to non-financial corporations and households.
The liquidity distributed to banking system through the above measures between October 2008 and December 2016 conducted to an important expansion of ECB's balance sheet.
Graphic 2 The evolution of ECB's balance sheet between 1999 -2016 (year-end, million EUR)
Source: ECB -Annual consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystemhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/annual/balance/html/index.en.html
Starting from 2008, there is a significant increase in the variables with monetary policy purposes, namely lending to credit institutions from euro area and securities holdings of euro area residents. In 2008, the volume of lending to credit institutions (mainly through LTROs) increased by 220% compared with 2000, while the peak was achieved in 2012, increasing by 320% compared with 2000 and by 30% compared with the value from 2008. ECB started to hold securities in 2009 through CBPP, representing then only 1.5% from ECB's assets and reaching in 2016 a percent of 54% of ECB's assets.
The effectiveness of policy interventions in EU
The main aim of the adopted measures was to support the transmission of ECB's standard interest rates policy. As the economy financing is mostly bankbased in Europe, ECB's monetary policy focused primarily on banks, aiming at supporting their funding and liquidity conditions, to ensure that banks will continue to provide credit to the economy. 
ECB Balance Sheet
1 Gold and gold receivables 2 Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 3 Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 4 Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro 5 Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro 6 Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro 7 Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro 8 General government debt denominated in euro 9 Other assets The overall impact of the unconventional monetary policies adopted during crisis has been studied by Falagiarda (2012) found that ECB's interventions conducted to higher bank loans to households and non-financial corporations and also, to higher levels of industrial production and lower unemployment rates compared with the counterfactual situation when no non-standard monetary policy were implemented.
The extension of the longer-term refinancing operations' maturities contributed to the stabilization of the real economy. Cahn, Matheron & Sahuc (2014) confirmed that longer maturities result in larger macroeconomic effects. The authors compared the effects of the six-months LTROs with the twelvemonths LTROs effects, concluding that the effects of the latter measure were even double than the previous ones.
The literature also provides evidence regarding the impact of the largest central bank liquidity injection -three-year LTROs . The three-year LTRO increased the credit supply by 2% in the Italian case, while for Spain the increase was more moderate, of about 0.8-1%. Indeed, the cash holdings increased for corporations that used bank loans and credits as their main source of debt financing following the LTRO interventions. However, the effects on real economy were not visible, as the additional cash received was not employed in a productive manner, corporations even reducing their investments and the level of employment (Daetz, Subrahmanyam, Yongjun Tang, & Qian Wang, 2016) . In contrast, Van der Kwaak (2017) found that banks did not expand credit to real economy, but they invested in government bonds that allow them to obtain more low-interest-rate central bank funding and thereby to increase their profits. Szczerbowicz (2012) confirmed that the three-year refinancing operations succeded in reducing bank refinancing costs.
The first Covered Bond Purchase Program succeded in achieving all its policy objectives during the implementation period (Beirne, et al., 2011) and to revitalise the primary market for these bonds (ECB, July 2009). Markmann & Zietz (2017) confirmed the results obtained by Beirne et al. (2011) finding a 10-11 basis points tightening of covered bond spreads that lasted for seven weeks. The authors also analysed the impact of following two CBPPs on secondary markets concluding that the effects of these programs were lower than the effect of the first CBPP. These results are explained by the fact the covered bond markets was in a rather healtly shape when the second CBPP was announced and did not show any signs of weakness at the time of the third CBPP (Markmann & Zietz, 2017) . However, the programs were implemented in order to accomplish macroeconomic objectives.
Gibson, Hall & Tavlas (2016) studied the effects of the ECB's asset purchase programs, CBPP and SMP, on sovereign bond spreads and covered-bond prices for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The results suggest that both programs reduced the sovereign spreads and raised the covered bond prices. The same results have been obtained by Szczerbowicz (2015) , while Kilponen, Laakkonen & Vilmunen (2015) did not find lasting impact on government bond spreads. The impact of CBPP and SMP is also studied on commercial bank CDS spreads by Gerlach-Kristen (2015), who finds that individual bank default risks decreased after the purchases under the two programs by the Eurosystem. Kilponen, Laakkonen & Vilmunen (2015) analyzed the impact of a package of monetary policies 11 on sovereign bond spreads and concluded that SMP and OMT had the largest negative impact on bond spreads. This result is confirmed by Watfe (2015) , Szczerbowicz (2015) , Falagiarda & Reitz (2015) . Moreover, Altavilla, Giannone & Lenza (2014) concluded that the reduction of govermnet bond yields due to OMT is associated with a significant increase in real activity, credit and prices in Italy and Spain. The impact of SMP, OMT and of the threeyear LTROs on the Italian economy has been studied by Casiraghi, Gaiotti, Rodano & Secchi (2016) confirming the fact that these measures induced a cumulative output growth response equal to 2.7 percentage points in 2012-13. Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger & Hirsch (2015) found that the OMT conducted to a reduction in the sovereign yields for the GIIPS countries that lead to an increase in the supply of loans to firms and to a decrease in bank credit risk, but with no impact on the employment level or investments.
The Expended Asset Purchase Programme or qualitative easing measure, is a more recent measure and its effects are still ongoing. However, there a few studies that asses its effectiveness on sovereign yields (De Santis, 2016; Andrade et al., 2016) and on macroeconomy (Andrade et al., 2016) . Andrade et al. (2016) found that APP contributes to the economy stabilization through asset price and inflation rate increases. On the other side, the Public Sector Purchase Programme, part of the APP, had no significant effects on sovereign bonds spreads (Watfe, 2015) .
To sum up, the unconventional monetary policies adopted by ECB during the financial crisis succeeded in supporting the transmission of its standard interest rate policy. The monetary policy conducted by ECB stabilized the financial system and the economy by achieving their objectives: to support banks' funding and to increase lending to real economy (LTROs), to calm tensions from bond markets (CBPP, SMP, OMT), to support economic activity and to stabilize inflation rate (SMP, OMT, LTROs, APP).
US VS. EU APPROACH
Despite the US monetary approach, the adopted non-standard monetary policies from EU aimed at supporting the effective transmission of its standard policy. Therefore, the non-standard measures are a complement rather than a substitute for interest rate policy. Through this approach, ECB succeeded in improving the financial conditions and credit flows (Cour-Thirmann & Winkler, 2013).
Another difference between the two economies and their monetary policy decisions refers to the financial structure. Given that the economy is largely financed by banks in Europe, the ECB non-standard monetary policy focused mainly on banks, by lending to a large number of banks against collateral in order to improve their funding and liquidity conditions (Rodriguez & Carrasco, 2014) . When the global financial crisis started, in late August 2007, both central banks responded by cutting interest rates and by adopting several unconventional monetary policies. These policies included the extension of the maturities for the existing facilities -refinancing operations, lowering the standards for eligible collateral applied to banks and opening a series of swap facilities. The Lehman Brothers collapse generated a lack of confidence and liquidity in the interbank market. In order to facilitate the access to liquidities, central authorities intervened by expending the availability of credit to financial institutions, reducing the main interest rates and by asset purchases. Fed purchased under TALF commercial papers, asset-backed securities and other private assets, while ECB implemented CBPP, fixed-rate tender procedure with full-allotment, extended the collateral list and the maturity of LTROs to six months and established swap lines with Fed.
In the second stage of the crisis (2010-2012), the problems were not the same in these two economies. While the euro area was confronting with high degree of financial distress, the main concern in the US was the fact the economy and the labour market were not recovering. Fed continues with asset purchases through open market operations and quantitative easing. In Europe, the crisis became a sovereign debt crisis with the epicenter in the Euro area. Starting from this point, the ECB's policies differed substantially from those of Fed, by implementing SMP, CBPP and three-year LTROs.
Gros, Alcidi & Gionvanni (2012) highlighted some more differences between the Fed's and ECB's policies. The Fed bought mostly risk-free assets like US government bonds and government-guaranteed bonds, while ECB invested in risky assets, the Fed lent very little to banks, while ECB lent huge amounts to banks and, consequently, Fed did quantitative easing, while ECB did credit easing. Hancock & Passmore (2011) concluded that the Fed's purchase of mortgagebacked securities as part of its first quantitative easing improved market functioning the primary and secondary markets for these instruments.
For Europe, the CBPP can be comparable with the QE1 conducted by Fed. As confirmed by Beirne et al., (2011) and Markmann & Zietz (2017) this program succeded in tightening to reduce money market term rates, to ease funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises, to encourage credit institutions to maintain or to expand their lending to households and enterprises and to improve market liquidity in important segments of private debt securities markets.
CONCLUSION
In response to the global financial crisis central authorities around the world adopted a series of non-standard measures designed to ease credit and liquidity constraints in order to restore financial stability and to maintain lending to real economy.
As affirmed by Farruggio, Michalak, & Uhde (2013), TARP had a light and a dark side. The light side refers to the positive effects had on financial systemreduced the contribution of banks to systemic risk, the default probabilities on the short-term, increased shareholder value. In contrast, there are studies that proved the program inefficiency -reduced banks' loan growth and increase their risk-taking. However, TARP helped stop the widespread of financial panic and restored the investor's confidence.
The ECB's policies achieved their primary objective of supporting banks to continue lending to real economy. After reviewing the literature, we can conclude that banks increased their supply to households and non-financial corporations, but the impact on economy was limited. However, the adopted measures succeeded in calming the tensions from primary and secondary markets.
If we review the US and ECB approches we can see that at the beginning of the financial crisis, central authorities acted broadly similar. The two important governments responded by cutting interest rates and by adopting several unconventional monetary policies -extension of the maturities for the existing facilities, lowering the standards for eligible collateral applied to banks and opening a series of swap facilities. If we refer to the differences between the central authorities' approches we have to take into account that the US economy is marketbased, while the ECB's economy is bank-based. The differences intervened after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the manifestation of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The measures adopted by Federal Reserve System have been more expansive and have targeted also individual financial intermediaries, while the European Central Bank actions have been limited to liquidity extension. Another difference between the policies adopted by the two economies refer to the fact that capital injections were a requirement in the US, while in Europe capital support has typically been voluntary.
